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Abstract 
This paper tests the hypothesis that upper-level governments can transfer the 
accountability of the costs of a reform to a lower one. The reform of the school rhythm 
in France provides the ground for a verification of this hypothesis, as it was nationally 
decided and locally implemented, right before a municipal election. The results 
confirm that local incumbents have taken the blame of the reform, especially in larger 
cities and if they belong to the governing coalition. In this case, thus, the cost of the 
reform is borne twice by the lower level of government, financially and politically, 
offering a double gain to the government. That mayors who have announced a boycott 
of the reform have received electoral gains confirms the perception of the local cost of 
the reform.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of a series of deceiving results in PISA tests (OECD, 2014), the French 
government decided a reform of the school rhythm, starting from the elementary school level. 
Such a reform was considered necessary to obtain better results in the medium term. As such, 
this reform lies in conformity with the “crisis-induces-reform” hypothesis (see, e.g., Drazen 
and Grilli, 1993, or Agnello et al., 2015). However, in this case, it is the repetition of bad 
results of French pupils that creates the impetus for the reform, a scenario that would be in 
line with the argument on the dynamics of learning made by Tommasi and Velasco (1996), 
although in a very different context.1 
 
Moreover, the timing of the French school rhythm reform, implemented right after a 
Presidential election, could also be expected, as the political resistance to the reform is lower 
the further looms the next election (see, e.g., Alesina and Drazen, 1991, or Lora and Olivera, 
2004). Also, as reforms lead to redistribution impacts, electoral losses can be expected, 
reinforcing the incentive to push reforms early during the mandate (Dewatripont and Roland, 
1992, 1995; Padovano and Petrarca, 2013). The French government has apparently followed 
this conventional path, enforcing a reform of the French education system at the beginning of 
its mandate. 
 
However, what makes this reform particularly interesting is that, in this particular case, the 
newly elected government could also have a reduced incentive to postpone the reform by 
transferring the costs of the reform to a lower level of government. In other words, upper-
level politicians have anticipated that the costs of the reform would be borne by the local 
politicians, and that they would be gone by the next Presidential election. Such a framework 
has, to our knowledge, not been explored in the literature. Tandon (2012) explores the 
regional impact of a reform of Indian tariffs, looking at national elections, while Joanis (2013) 
examines the impact of different degrees of centralization on electoral accountability, we here 
focus on the “boomerang” effect of a national reform on local elections. 
 
                                                          
1 As the authors look at the situation of developing countries. Remark that Rodrik (1996) considers the link 
between crises and reforms as tautological, but his argument does not apply here, as the reform we consider 
takes place after a series of disappointing results, and not after a brutal and exogenous shock. 
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In this paper, we thus profit from the fact that local elections happen between national ones to 
analyze if voters punish the party of a newly elected national government that enforces a 
reform whose effects and implementation are local. We look at the impact of the 
implementation of a national reform locally implemented on local incumbent’s chances of 
reelection. So doing, we show how reforms could be accelerated, if their costs can, say, trickle 
down to a lower level of government. The French school rhythm reform thus provides a first-
rate opportunity to study the response of voters to a reform, if only because the largest 
opposition party strongly opposed the reform (both at the local and national level), even 
though it shared the government’s verdict on the need for reforming the school system.  
 
We first show that the option to adopt the reform early was clearly perceived by local 
politicians as costly. The variables related to the costs of implementing the reform are 
significantly related to an attempt to postpone it. Except for the municipalities in the most dire 
financial situation, where the subsidies offered in case of an early adoption appear to have 
skewed the politicians’ decisions. 
 
Then, we show that the hypothesis of a transfer of accountability from the upper-level of 
government to the lower one is confirmed, as incumbents who implemented the reform suffer 
from a reduction of their electoral margin, and the impact goes beyond a traditional midterm 
effect. Interestingly, mayors that decided to boycott the reform have been rewarded by the 
voters for doing so and left-wing boycotters have even been more rewarded than other 
boycotters. This confirms that (at least some of) the local incumbents clearly perceived the 
transfer of accountability and tried to deflect the blame. 
 
Beyond these results on voters’ behavior, our results can be put in perspective, as they tend to 
show that, if different political parties face different costs in implementing the same reform 
(Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998, Tandon, 2012), delegating the costs to a lower level of 
government provides a way to bypass the status-quo bias (Alesina and Drazen, 1991), in 
effect doing a dirty deed to local politicians. They also reveal that an option for a politician 
that wants to reveal her ability to voters can be to report the blame of a reform on others, 
which could reduce the incentive to engage in socially detrimental reforms (Fu and Li, 2014), 
and further the prospects of welfare-enhancing ones. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the institutional 
context of the reform. Section 3 presents the data and the results. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. The reform of the French school rhythm 
 
In France, the organization and functioning of education is traditionally under the jurisdiction 
of the central government. However, in the 1980s, some competences have been devolved to 
municipalities, departments and regions. Actually, municipalities are in charge of building, 
renovating and maintaining the public schools that are located in their territory, and they 
manage all related expenditures, whatever their nature (investment or functioning). If several 
schools are present, the municipal council decides upon the rules of allocation of children to 
schools (zoning). 
 
Importantly for our purpose, municipalities can (but are not obliged to) organize any 
complementary activity (educational or cultural as well as sports) they consider relevant, and 
they decide upon the opening hours. Also, for the kindergarten and elementary schools, they 
manage and organize the canteens, taking care of everything, from prices to menus to staff 
recruitment (outsourcing is of course allowed, although it is quite customary to have 
municipal staff in charge of the provision). Parents contribute financially to the feeding of 
their children, with contributions depending on their revenues. Municipalities also are in 
charge of the non-teaching staff, especially in kindergartens.  
 
The implemented reform intended to modify the school rhythm. In fact, since the institution 
of universal public education in the late 19th century in France, schoolchildren have benefited 
from a weekly day off (for a long time on Thursdays, for religious reasons, then on 
Wednesdays - since 1972). To make up for the lost teaching times, schools opened their doors 
on Saturday mornings but, in 2008, under Conservative President Nicolas Sarkozy, it was 
decided to compress the school week into a four day schedule and Saturday has become a no-
school day. 
 
However, shortly after the 2012 Presidential election – won by the Socialist François 
Hollande -, the government announced a reform of the school week structure, to shorten the 
school day for primary school pupils, which is currently deemed as too long to allow for 
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effective learning. Teaching hours would be spread out over the week to make up the hours by 
extending the current system of 4 days of classes per week to 4.5 days. More importantly for 
our purpose, municipalities could implement immediately or postpone the implementation of 
the reform. 
 
The reform essentially concerns kindergartens and elementary schools, hence directly 
impacting the municipalities, in the following ways. First, given the reduced school time, 
municipalities may have to organize more extracurricular activities, which has a direct 
financial impact (if only for petty stuff – paper, pens, balls, etc.). Second, if they ask (or 
request) the teachers to take care of the extracurricular activities, the extra-hours will have to 
be paid by municipalities (although the teachers are civil servants paid by the Ministry of 
Education for the normal time spent in class). Of course, municipalities can decide relying on 
extra staff, which they will nevertheless have to pay. The transition period can also be costly, 
as they have to recruit and (potentially learn to) manage new workers (in particular, 
specialized helpers in pre-school and after-school activities and extra canteen staff). Third, 
and important, the school transportation system will have to adapt, with an extra day of 
transport to be organized. The municipality may nevertheless share this last impact with its 
neighbors, if it belongs to a union of cities, or if the transportation system is managed by the 
upper-level of government (the “département”). The presence of such vertical links with the 
departmental council may in turn affect the diffusion of the reform. 
 
Concretely, the official launch of the reform is a decree (dated 26th, January 2013) stating that 
municipalities had to decide upon the adoption of the reform before the 31st, March 2013. If 
the mayor refuses to answer or to ask the council to take a formal vote (as they have done in a 
majority of cases), the Ministry would consider the refusal as an obligation to implement the 
reform in 2013. From September 2013, some mayors decided to boycott the reform and not to 
implement it, even in 2014. Figure 1 displays the sequence of events. 
 
Importantly, the municipal elections were programmed and held in March 2014, and the 
announcements by incumbents that they would boycott the reform increased strongly: while it 
first was a very marginal phenomenon before November 2013, at the eve of the first round of 
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municipal elections, 13% of incumbent mayors in municipalities with more than 3,500 
inhabitants planned to boycott the implementation in September 2014.2 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of the reform 
 
Source: authors 
 
Hence, this offers a case study of a reform decided by an upper-level government (here, the 
national government) whose cost is fully borne by the lower-level governments (here, 
municipalities). 
 
Moreover, it has to be added that, as the time schedule of class was modified, this would have 
some impact on the parents’ own rhythms, which explains that the reform was resented as 
disturbing by most parents (i.e., voters) and teachers, not to re-insist on the mayors, on whom 
the empirical part focuses. The question thus arises to know if, with local elections looming, 
the electoral cost would be supported by the local incumbents or by the national one at the 
next Presidential election. With the next Presidential election held in 2017, we here focus on 
verifying the transfer of accountability hypothesis. 
 
  
                                                          
2 In the end, the government threatened to use all the legal powers it has to force the municipalities into 
implementing the reform and, at the start of the next school year (September 2014), the reform was enforced 
across the whole territory. 
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3.  Assessing the local electoral consequences of the reform 
 
To assess if voters have held the incumbent local politicians accountable of the 
implementation of the national reform (“responsibility hypothesis”), we follow the 
comprehensive approach developed by Padovano and Petrarca (2014), consisting in the 
estimation of both a policy setting equation and a vote popularity equation. 
 
3.1. Data 
 
Our sample includes all the municipalities with more than 3,500 inhabitants. This threshold is 
related to the fact that two different voting rules exist, depending upon the size of the 
municipality, with the two rounds list system applying above 3,500 inhabitants. 2615 French 
municipalities (Corsica excluded) are subjected to this two-round electoral rule in 2008, i.e., 
7% of French municipalities, but 60% of the French metropolitan population.3 The threshold 
is also induced by the absence of school in many of the smaller municipalities, meaning that 
they often share the school with several other municipalities (often belonging to the same 
inter-communal structure). In such a case, municipalities must cooperate to determine if they 
wish to implement the school rhythm reform in 2013, which makes it more difficult to 
identify the determinants of the choice.  
 
We choose to focus on the effect of the reform in the first round incumbent’s margin (as the 
election ends at the first round in more than 60% of the cities we consider). Three sets of 
explanatory variables are gathered. Table 1 summarizes the data sources and descriptive 
statistics. To save on space, we below precise the expected sign for each variables only when 
it may not be obvious with regard to our hypothesis. 
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
Local school context 
                                                          
3 The electoral rule has been changed in 2014. Before that, the rule was different between the municipalities 
hosting less than 3,500 inhabitants, and the ones hosting more. The threshold has been reduced to 1,000 
inhabitants for the election of 2014. Hence, for consistency reasons, we focus on cities with more than 3,500 
inhabitants. 
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The first set of variables relates to the local school context itself. First, it has to be 
acknowledged that practical and budgetary difficulties may arise when applying the reform to 
larger numbers of school-age children and public schools. The larger the proportion of school-
age children in the municipal population is, the larger the global cost of extracurricular 
activities to be financed by the municipality. 80% of municipalities have 10 public schools at 
most. We thus introduce a dummy variable, equal to 1 if there are less than 10 public schools 
in the municipality. The large number of schools can create problems to hire and manage 
group leaders able to organize games, cultural and sporting activities during extracurricular 
activities. Moreover, school directors and parents could have conflicting preferences on the 
new organization of the school week between educational institutions, which may complicate 
the municipal choice and delay the implementation of the reform.  
 
It is a common sense argument that long school days can result in a lower performance of 
pupils, with the worst impact to be experienced by children living in deprived urban areas. 
The literature so far has, to our knowledge, not proved the point. However, existing results 
show that extending the length of a school day is at best neutral and could even be 
detrimental, if the end of the week interruption is too long (see, Delvolvé and Jeunier, 1999, 
for the latter point, and De Cicca, 2007, Mayer and Klaveren, 2013, Taylor, 2014, for results 
in different contexts and levels).4 Schools in those areas belong to a Priority Education 
Network whose objective is to attenuate the impact of socio-economic inequalities on school 
performance. We introduce a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if some schools in the 
municipality belong to a priority education network, and 0 otherwise. Children in these 
municipalities would greatly benefit from a reform whose aims are to improve learning and to 
foster educational success and we can expect mayors to be more inclined to quickly 
implement the reform there.  
 
Then, as soon as the decree has been published, some mayors of rural municipalities voiced 
concern with regard to the recruitment of qualified staff, the physical availability of space and 
the cost of school busing. We introduce a dummy variable to account for the specific 
difficulties that could delay the implementation of the reform in rural areas. 
 
                                                          
4 The consequences of a long school day are different from those of a longer school year, the latter tending to 
benefit the pupils and students (as shown by, e.g., Kikuchi, 2014, Parinduri, 2014, Agüero and Beleche, 2013, in 
very different contexts). 
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We also take into account existing vertical links between layers of government that come 
from their respective competencies relative to pre-schools and primary schools. As explained 
above, city unions can be endowed with competencies over extracurricular activities and 
school transportation. Thus, we introduce two variables that capture, respectively, if 
competences on extracurricular activities and school transport have been devolved to the city 
union. Finally, municipalities within a city union observe the core city’s choice and could 
follow it.  
 
The 2010 territorial authorities reform planned the completion of the inter-municipal map by 
the 1st of January 2014. Many municipalities joined a city union during this period while 
mergers of city unions also took place. In both cases, competences devolved to municipalities 
and the city union are likely to be modified, especially in extra-curricular activities and school 
transportation. As the competences changed, mayors might prefer to delay the implementation 
of the reform. 
 
Budget data 
As municipalities are endowed with competence over primary school, they must finance the 
after school activities generated by the reform. The government has created a specific subsidy 
(“fonds d’amorçage”) and has budgeted 250 millions euros to cover the transition costs for the 
fast-adopters. Viewed as an incentive to adopt the reform in 2013, this subsidy aims at 
rewarding municipalities for the signal they send in adopting the reform in 2013. However, 
municipalities and their representative bodies have denounced the cost of the reform, 
providing various estimates of the per-pupil cost of it.  
 
This not only suggests that budgetary concerns are an important determinant of the 
willingness to implement the reform, but that municipalities may have to raise local taxes to 
finance the reform, which they may be reluctant to do (especially right before an election and 
even more so in municipalities where the tax burden is already high). By the same reasoning, 
the level of municipal debt should also affect mayors’ choices. We thus assume that local 
choices by mayors are constrained by the structure of their municipal budget. Debt is 
expressed in thousands of euros per capita, while the tax effort – a proxy of the tax burden 
computed by the government - is calculated by dividing the amount of taxes collected by the 
municipality on households (property tax on developed and undeveloped property and 
housing tax) by an estimate of how much tax the municipality should be able to collect given 
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its tax bases. This measure enables the comparison of the actual taxes and the expected taxes 
if the municipality applied the average national tax rates. 2012 data are used as the choice to 
implement the reform has been taken between January and March 2013 (between September 
2013 and March 2014 as for the choice to boycott it, see Figure 1).  
 
Besides, poorer municipalities receive additional grants from the State to implement the 
reform (atop from the "fonds d'amorçage", a lump-sum grant which amounts to 50€ per pupil 
and an additional grant of 40€ per pupil if the municipality is located in a poor surrounding). 
The additional State aid is dedicated to the poorest municipalities, the ones that receive the 
targeted urban solidarity grant ("DSU-cible") or the targeted rural solidarity grant ("DSR-
cible"). To analyze if the additional State aid has an incentive effect on the probability to 
implement the reform in 2013, we introduce two dummy variables: the first one (“aid to poor 
urban municipalities”) is equal to 1 if the municipality receives the targeted urban solidarity 
grant and 0 otherwise, while the second one (“aid to poor rural municipalities”) is equal to 1 if 
the municipality receives the targeted rural solidarity grant.  
 
As voters may also be sensitive to several aspects of local public management, we include 
three other items in the vote function: staff costs per capita, operating expenditures per capita 
(excluding staff costs) and equipment spending per capita. For these, we use 2013 financial 
data, because elections are held in March of the following year. 
 
Political variables 
A third set of data is related to the mayor’s personal and political characteristics. Even if the 
municipal council is the decision-making body, power is centralized in the hands of the 
mayor, who has authority over the municipality's civil servants and takes all decisions relative 
to the implementation of its budget. As a consequence, personal characteristics of the mayor 
could affect the probability of an early implementation of the reform.  
 
Detailed information on personal characteristics of mayors is provided through the national 
directory of elected officials (French interior ministry). A dummy “Less than 60 years old” is 
included as to reflect potential nostalgia for school weeks that run on four and a half days as it 
was the norm up to 2008. Even though the proportion of women mayors is still extremely low 
in France (11%, see Table 1), a dummy variable accounts for this fact. The experimental 
economics literature on gender differences acknowledges that women are more risk averse 
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than men when facing a risky situation (see, for example, Croson and Gneezy, 2009). 
Implementing a controversial reform can be considered as such a risky move, and we thus 
expect a negative sign for this variable. 
 
Four specific socio-professional categories are used as proxies of the mayors’ sense of public 
service and of the capacity to focus on the children's interests. Teachers (from preschool 
teachers to higher-education teaching personnel) are first considered. On the one hand, with a 
significant knowledge of how schoolchildren and students learn best, they should be the best 
motivated to an early implementation of the reform. On the other hand, they could be 
unfavorable to a reform that increases the spread of weekly working hours of their fellows 
without pay compensation. Civil servants (other than teachers) and workers in public 
enterprises should bear in mind –to some extent- the public service values and the will to 
ensure quality education to children. Physicians should be responsive to the impact of the 
school time schedule on children’s health. They are in a position to promote a reform directed 
towards the interests of children, not their parents'. We create a dummy variable for each 
category. 
 
Another subgroup of political variables accounts for the links between the local and national 
political contexts. We include a dummy equal to 1 if the incumbent mayor and the majority in 
Parliament are from the same political party and 0 if not. Likewise, another dummy expresses 
the similarity of political leaning between the challenger and the majority in Parliament. 
These variables control for the potential influence of the national government’s popularity on 
local elections. French voters commonly consider municipal elections as midterms and use 
them to penalize government and the parliamentary majority for poor performance. We use a 
variable to control for the vote share received by presidential candidate from the incumbent 
mayor’s party in the second round of the last presidential election. Dummies for the 
incumbent’s national standing are included and are equal to 1 if she is a deputy or a senator, 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
Also, a weak electoral support should restrict the available policy space the mayor needs to 
implement a controversial reform, while strong past electoral results should provide more 
leeway for local public choices. Electoral support can be expressed either by a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the mayor was elected in the first round in the last election, or by the 
absolute margin between the mayor and her main challenger at the final round. 
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The number of consecutive mandates won by the mayor also deals with the past electoral 
support. We build three dummy variables to account for the number of terms of office and the 
ability of the mayor to be reelected: “2nd term”, “3rd term” and “more than 3 terms”. The 
expected sign for all these variables is positive: implementing a controversial reform should 
not prevent the reelection of the mayor, which could increase the probability of starting the 
new school schedule in 2013.  
 
Finally, to account for the incumbent and the challenger candidates' characteristics without 
increasing the number of variables introduced into the model, we also introduce variables that 
relate the gap between the incumbent and the challenger in terms of gender and of age in the 
vote popularity equation. 
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable of interest, with regard to the hypothesis we test, is the margin 
between incumbent's score and the challenger's one. However, to evaluate how voters valuate 
mayors that have implemented a costly reform, we have to take into account a selection issue: 
only the mayors who have implemented the reform can be made accountable. This leads us to 
implement a two-step procedure, and to consider for the first step a dependent variable that 
takes the value 1 when the reform has been implemented, 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2. Method 
 
As stated right above, to control for selection issues related to the choice of an early (resp. 
postponed) implementation of the reform, we follow a two-step procedure. In the first step, 
the choice of early implementation (𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚2013𝑖) is our first binary dependent variable.
5 
This observed decision takes the value 1 if the municipality decided to implement the reform 
in 2013 and 0 otherwise. This choice depends on the difference in utilities between the two 
alternatives (early reform and postponed reform): 𝑈1;𝑖 − 𝑈0;𝑖. The probit model assumes that 
this difference, 𝑈∗ = 𝑈1;𝑖 − 𝑈0;𝑖, follows a normal distribution. However, 𝑈
∗ is not 
observable, as only the real choices are known, which is reflected in: 
 
                                                          
5 We also perform and report the estimates with boycotting the implementation in 2014 as the 
dependent variable.  
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𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚2013𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑈
∗
𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚2013𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓𝑈
∗
𝑖 < 0 
 
In the model, we consider the impact the characteristics of the municipality i that we have 
described over the net utility of the mayor, and thus on the probability to implement the 
reform in 2013. The Probit decision model is thus: 
 
Reform2013i = 1 if U
*
i = c +  i + ei > 0,      (1) 
Reform2013i = 0 otherwise, 
 
where 𝑈∗𝑖 is the unobservable latent dependent variable, c is the intercept, i is the set of 
relevant (school, financial and political) characteristics of the municipality, and 𝑒𝑖 ∼ N (0,1) is 
a disturbance term. In addition to the standard White correction for heteroskedasticity, we 
correct for clustering at the departmental level using the Froot's correction (Froot, 1989). 
 
In robustness checks, we will interact some of our control variables to strengthen and refine 
the analysis. However, the magnitude and standard errors of the interaction effect in nonlinear 
models are not correctly estimated. As stated by Ai and Norton (2003), the magnitude of the 
interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction 
term, and can be of opposite sign. We will thus introduce interaction terms in the estimation 
following the methodology built by Norton et al. (2004) to compute the magnitude of the 
interaction effect. 
 
In the second step, we study the incumbent’s margin in the first round of the 2014 municipal 
election by standard linear equation. We compute the margin (INC2014i) as the difference 
between the share of votes received by the incumbent and that of her principal challenger. 
First, we test whether the implementation of the reform in 2013 affects the incumbent’s result 
in municipal elections held in March 2014 (equation 2). For obvious (if technical) reasons, we 
cannot introduce in the same equation a dummy variable indicating those who promote 
boycotting the reform (equation 3). In addition to the key variables related to the reform, the 
three set of determinants of the mayor’s popularity that have been described above are 
included: 
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INC2014i = 1 Reform2013i + 1 ’i + i ,      (2) 
INC2014i = 2 Boycotti + 2 ’i + i ,      (3) 
 
The expected share of votes for the incumbent in the first round clearly influences the 
probability of adopting an electorally risky reform in 2013. Endogeneity concerns in a dummy 
variable should be controlled for by estimating a treatment effect model based on Heckman 
control function. Endogeneity arises in this case because the treatment (REFORM2013) is 
correlated with the error term in the outcome (vote function) equation. The treatment effect 
model simultaneously estimates equations for the likelihood of treatment (REFORM2013, 
equation 1) and the outcome of the treatment (the incumbent margin, equation 2). This 
simultaneous estimation allows the elimination of endogeneity, although with the trade-off of 
making the assumption that the error terms are jointly normally distributed. Maximum 
likelihood techniques were used to estimate the model.  
 
However, it seems relevant to consider that treatment effects vary with the political 
characteristics of the municipalities that implemented the reform in 2013. The estimated 
model is thus the following: 
 
INC2014i = 3 Reform2013i + 4 (Reform2013i * Poli ) + 3 ’i + + i ,   (4) 
Reform2013i = 1 if U
*
i = c +  i + ei > 0,       (5) 
Reform2013i = 0 otherwise. 
 
In the presence of such interactions between the treatment variable and another explanatory 
variable, there are two endogenous variables in the model (Reform2013i and the interaction 
term, Reform2013i * Poli ). Nevertheless, the maximum likelihood technique presented above 
is not affected by the introduction of this second endogenous variable and estimates remain 
consistent (as shown by Brown and Mergoupis, 2010).  
 
 
4. Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 display the results of the simultaneous estimates of the above equations (4) and 
(5). Table 2 reports the estimation results for the implementation year (equation 5) and details, 
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in the first two columns, our baseline regression results for all municipalities above the 3,500 
inhabitants electoral threshold, whereas columns 3 to 6 deal with the subsamples of 
municipalities with less than 9,000 inhabitants and more than 9,000 inhabitants.  
 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
Results about internal determinants reveal that the reform has been more easily embraced in 
smaller municipalities, the ones that host less than 10 schools. The proportion of school age 
children significantly, strongly and negatively influences the probability of adoption in 2013. 
Interestingly, and somewhat paradoxically, belonging to the Priority Education Network has 
not statistically influenced the adoption. 
 
The level of taxes has been a clear impediment to the quick adoption of the reform, probably 
for fear of the increase in spending related to the extra-curricular activities. Interestingly, 
though, the level of debt has a positive impact on the dependent variable. This may be due to 
the fact that mayors in relatively highly indebted municipalities embrace the reform because 
they are searching for new sources of funds, even if temporary ones, and thus respond to get 
the extra transfers from the government. In the robustness checks provided in columns 7 to 
12, we interact the municipal debt with the fact that the municipality receives an aid dedicated 
to poor municipalities, confirming that only poor and heavily indebted municipalities are 
more likely to implement the reform in 2013.  
 
As regards vertical links, we show that city union competencies have an impact on the early 
implementation of the reform but only in the subsample of municipalities above 9,000 
inhabitants. When the city union has competency over extracurricular activities, it increases 
the probability of an early implementation in the municipality (which should not have to bear 
the cost of these activities). However, when the city union is in charge of school 
transportation, it significantly reduces the probability of early implementation, as 
municipalities should then cooperate on the modalities of the reform. Finally, municipalities 
follow the core city’s decision: when the core city chooses to implement the reform in 2013, it 
has a positive impact on the early implementation by the other municipalities within the city 
union and a negative impact on the decision to boycott the reform in 2014.  
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Few variables related to the mayor's appear to be significant, except for the age and a 
profession in the civil service. The latter can be understood as either a revelator of a form of 
loyalty towards the state legislation, or a bias towards values related to the Left. This is 
confirmed by the fact that teachers have a positive leaning towards the reform, as they are less 
likely to have boycotted it).6 The impact of age can be related to a nostalgia effect of the 
rhythm schools had before 2008. 
 
However, the most important coefficients are the ones attached to the alignment of the mayor 
with regard to the governmental coalition. Left-wing mayors are more prone to support the 
reform and to undertake it without delay. And the variables that are related to the local 
political context (past electoral results, number of consecutive mandates won by the 
incumbent mayor) are not significant, highlighting the strong impact of the national situation. 
The higher François Hollande’s score (in the 2012 presidential election in the municipality), 
the higher the probability of adoption in 2013. It means that mayors also take left-leaning 
voters into account, even when the former do not belong to the governmental coalition.  
 
All in all, then, these first results reveal a strong impact of practical, financial and political 
characteristics of the municipality.  
 
We now turn to the second part of the model, which forms the core of our investigation. Table 
3 reports results about the incumbent margin in the first round of 2014 municipal election, to 
assess the local political cost of the national reform. Estimations are performed on the whole 
sample, and then on several subsamples, based on the population size of the municipality (see 
table 3, columns 3 to 6 for baseline results, and 9 to 12 for robustness checks). We can reject 
the null hypothesis of no correlation between the treatment errors and the outcome errors 
except for municipalities under 9,000 inhabitants.7 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
 
The main coefficients of interest here are those related to the implementation of the reform as 
we want to test whether voters hold mayors responsible for the implementation of the reform. 
                                                          
6 In Saint-Paul’s (2010) theoretical model, the left-leaning of the teachers is shown to have an impact on agents’ 
preferences. 
7 For this specific subsample, there is thus no need to estimate a treatment effect model and it is possible to use 
standard OLS.  
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No evidence is found that the implementation of the reform (early adoption or boycott) has 
affected voters’ choice in municipalities with less than 9,000 inhabitants (table 3, columns 3-4 
and 9-10). However, the responsibility hypothesis is strongly verified in larger municipalities, 
where political stakes are stronger for political parties and politicians. There, it clearly appears 
that incumbents who implemented the reform in September 2013 are sanctioned: they would 
have had a 2% higher margin if they had not applied the reform. On the opposite, they are 
rewarded if they announced the boycott of the reform before the election, and the average 
reward is as large as 3% (compared to the incumbents who would not have announced the 
boycott). In columns 7 to 12, we refine the analysis to determine if this sanction/reward 
mechanism differs according to the incumbent’s political side and find that, whatever her 
political affiliation, the early adopter incumbent receives a smaller margin, hence enduring a 
political cost from the reform. In contrast, left-wing boycotters are even more rewarded than 
other boycotters, which confirms that our hypothesis of a transfer of the political cost of a 
reform from one decision level to the other has been perceived by (at least a part of) the local 
politicians.  
If a mayor belongs to the leading coalition in parliament, the margin is reduced, a standard 
result in French municipal electoral studies, corresponding to a midterm effect. Reciprocally, 
the incumbent margin increases if her main challenger belongs to the governmental coalition.  
 
As for budgetary variables, results are in line with existing studies of the vote function in 
France (see, e.g., Dubois and Paty, 2010, or Cassette et al., 2013). Staff costs have a positive 
impact on the incumbent’s margin, supporting the idea that voters consider this to be more 
useful spending than standard operating expenditures. Spending on equipment also appears to 
be valued by voters. Incumbents in heavily indebted municipalities benefit from a lower 
margin, whatever the size of the municipality, which also can be related to our starting 
hypothesis. 
 
Finally, being a deputy or a senator is favorable to the incumbent but only in municipalities 
above the 9,000 inhabitants threshold. If the incumbent has been elected at the first round of 
the election at the preceding election, it has no impact on her 2014 margin. And the number of 
consecutive mandates has a non-linear impact, first increasing the margin, until electoral 
fatigue effect takes place, (slightly) reducing the incumbency premium. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper studies how voters do reward or blame their local politicians for the 
implementation of reform decided at the national level. The results confirm that local 
incumbents have taken the blame of implementing the reform, especially in larger cities and if 
they belong to the governing coalition. In this case, thus, the cost of the reform is borne twice 
by the lower level of government, financially and politically, offering a double gain to the 
government. The fact that left-wing boycotters have received higher electoral gains than other 
boycotters suggests that they expected it, and feared more their voters’ sanction than their 
party’s blame.  
 
The hypothesis of a transfer of accountability is thus supported by the evidence coming from 
the French school rhythm reform. Mayors not only bear the budgetary cost of the reform but 
also the electoral ones. Both explain their reluctance to apply it. Test of the transfer of 
accountability hypothesis can only be complete with the next Presidential election (2017), but 
then disentangling the effects will be made harder as many more than the education reform 
will concur to explain the results.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics and expected effects 
Variables  Sources Obs. Summary statistics 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
MAYOR’S POLICY      
REFORM2013 1 if the school rhythm reform has been implemented in the municipality as soon as 
September 2013 
Departmental  
services of the  
Ministry of  
National 
Education 
2615 
 
0,23 
 
0,42 
 
0 1 
BOYCOTT 1 if the municipality refuses to implement the reform in 2014 www.clrdrs.fr 2615 
 
0,10 0,30 0 1 
BUDGET DATA      
Tax effort amount of taxes collected by the municipality on households  divided by an estimate of how 
much tax the municipality should be able to collect given its tax bases if the municipality 
applied the average national tax rates. 
Census of the 
Ministry of  
Finance 
2612 1.02 0,28 0,08 2.64 
LOCAL DEBT Municipal Debt (thousands of euros per capita) 2612 0,95 0,69 0 11,45 
MAYOR’S PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS      
Less than 60 y.o 1 if the mayor is less than 60 y.o., 0 otherwise Ministry of  
Internal  
Affairs 
2612 0.37 0.48 0 1 
WOMAN 1 if the mayor is a woman, 0 otherwise 2612 0,11 0,31 0 1 
TEACHER 1 if the mayor if a teacher, 0 otherwise 2612 0,15 0,36 0 0 
CIVIL SERVANT 1 if the mayor is a civil servant, 0 otherwise 2612 0,15 0,36 0 1 
PUBLIC 
ENTERPRISES 
1 if the mayor works in a public enterprise, 0 otherwise 2612 
 
0,05 
 
0,21 
 
0 1 
PHYSICIANS 1 if the mayor if a physician, 0 otherwise 2612 0,04 0,19 0 1 
links between the local and national political contexts      
COALGOV 1 if the mayor and the majority in Parliament belong to the same political party, 0 otherwise Ministry of  
Internal  
Affairs 
2612 
 
0,33 
 
0,46 
 
0 1 
OTHER_LEFT 1 if the mayor is from other leftist parties, 0 otherwise 2612 
 
0,18 
 
0,38 
 
0 1 
DEPUTY 1 if the mayor is a deputy, 0 otherwise 2612 0,06 0,24 0 1 
SENATOR 1 if the mayor is a senator, 0 otherwise 2612 0,03 0,16 0 1 
PRESID_LEFT Incumbent party share of votes at the presidential election 2612 51.79 9.76 14.25 78.22 
Mayors’ past electoral results      
1ST ROUND  1 if the mayor was elected in the first round of the preceding election, 0 otherwise Ministry of  
Internal  
Affairs 
2612 
 
0,67 
 
0,46 
 
0 1 
INCPREV incumbent party’s margin in the last municipal election 2612 
 
23.63 27.04 0 100 
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2nd term 
1 if the mayor spends her 2nd term in office, 0 otherwise 
2612 
 
0,37 
 
0,47 
 
0 1 
3rd term 1 if the mayor spends her 3rd term in office, 0 otherwise 2612 
 
0,15 
 
0,36 
 
0 1 
More than 
 3 terms 
1 if the mayor already spent more than 3 terms in office,  0 otherwise 2612 
 
0,15 
 
0,35 
 
0 1 
local school context      
POP 2-14  Share of school-age children (2 to 14 y.o.) INSEE 2612 0,16 0,02 0,08 0,26 
Less than 10 
schools 
1 if there are less than 10 schools in the municipality, 0 otherwise 2615 
 
0,81 
 
0,39 
 
0 1 
Priority Education  
Network 
1 if some schools in the municipality belong to a priority education network, 0 otherwise 2612 
 
0,21 
 
0,40 
 
0 1 
Aid to poor urban  
municipalities 
1 if municipality received the targeted urban solidarity grant, 0 otherwise Census of the  
Ministry of  
Finance 
2612 
 
0,11 
 
0,31 
 
0 1 
Aid to poor rural  
municipalities 
1 if municipality received the targeted rural solidarity grant, 0 otherwise 2612 
 
0,16 
 
0,36 
 
0 1 
Vertical links      
Extraact 
_cityunion 
1 if competences on extracurricular activities have been devolved to the city union, 0 
otherwise 
BANATIC, 
Ministry  
of Internal  
Affairs 
2612 
 
0,21 
 
0,41 
 
0 1 
Transport 
_cityunion 
1 if competences on school transportation have been devolved to the city union, 0 otherwise 2612 
 
0,30 
 
0,46 
 
0 1 
Core city of the city 
union 
1 if municipality is the core city of the city union, 0 otherwise 2615 0.41 0.49 0 1 
intensity of electoral competition in 2014      
NB1_same Number of candidates at the first round, same wing Ministry of  
Internal  
Affairs 
2612 
 
1.35 1.18 0 9 
NB1_opp 
 
Number of candidates at the first round, opposite wing 2612 
 
0.74 1.17 0 6 
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Table 2: Early vs. postponed implementation of the reform: baseline results and robustness checks 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
VARIABLES REFORM2013 BOYCOTT REFORM2013 BOYCOTT REFORM2013 BOYCOTT REFORM2013 BOYCOTT REFORM2013 BOYCOTT REFORM2013 BOYCOTT
0.076*** -0.030 0.094*** -0.022 0.073*** -0.033 0.093*** -0.023
(0.027) (0.023) (0.035) (0.019) (0.027) (0.023) (0.033) (0.018)
-1.152*** 0.571** -0.943* 0.468** -1.638*** 0.983* -1.229*** 0.650** -1.006* 0.500** -1.698*** 1.013*
(0.368) (0.270) (0.519) (0.223) (0.549) (0.537) (0.381) (0.266) (0.516) (0.229) (0.597) (0.533)
-0.051** 0.022 -0.058* 0.030 -0.043 -0.003 -0.042* 0.027 -0.049 0.055* -0.041 -0.005
(0.025) (0.023) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028)
0.063* 0.007 0.048 0.170*** 0.058 -0.017
(0.038) (0.024) (0.059) (0.061) (0.043) (0.031)
0.008 0.002 0.017 -0.003 -0.038 0.060
(0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.020) (0.101) (0.128)
-0.034 0.036 -0.040 0.041 -0.023 0.042
(0.033) (0.056) (0.039) (0.048) (0.065) (0.078)
-0.010 0.028 -0.047 0.048* 0.014 0.010 -0.014 0.034 -0.054 0.053* 0.009 0.010
(0.039) (0.026) (0.052) (0.025) (0.052) (0.043) (0.040) (0.028) (0.053) (0.028) (0.052) (0.043)
0.026** 0.006 0.028* -0.009 0.025 0.026*** 0.016 0.011* 0.019 -0.004 0.011 0.033***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.018) (0.008) (0.023) (0.011)
0.060** -0.050 0.075  -0.047 0.065  -0.053
(0.031) (0.043) (0.046) (0.049 ) (0.052) (0.051)
0.290*** -0.100*** 0.237*** -0.070*** 0.370*** -0.133*** 0.291*** -0.100*** 0.236*** -0.072*** 0.372*** -0.134***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.031) (0.014) (0.049) (0.036) (0.028) (0.019) (0.031) (0.013) (0.050) (0.036)
0.071** -0.032** 0.054 -0.043*** 0.127** -0.016 0.071** -0.032** 0.053* -0.041*** 0.127** -0.016
(0.028) (0.014) (0.033) (0.012) (0.063) (0.028) (0.028) (0.014) (0.032) (0.012) (0.065) (0.029)
0.034 0.011 0.007 0.009 0.074 0.003 0.032 0.011 0.006 0.008 0.070 0.004
(0.029) (0.014) (0.034) (0.019) (0.054) (0.023) (0.029) (0.013) (0.034) (0.019) (0.053) (0.023)
-0.036*** 0.004 -0.035* -0.012 -0.035 0.025 -0.035*** 0.005 -0.032* -0.010 -0.037 0.025
(0.013) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.024) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.024) (0.022)
0.024 -0.029** 0.046 -0.027** -0.015 -0.025 0.025 -0.027** 0.046 -0.026** -0.016 -0.023
(0.027) (0.013) (0.038) (0.013) (0.035) (0.024) (0.027) (0.013) (0.038) (0.013) (0.036) (0.023)
0.065*** 0.003 0.053* 0.005 0.094*** -0.003 0.065*** 0.004 0.055** 0.005 0.090** 0.001
(0.022) (0.019) (0.028) (0.022) (0.037) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.027) (0.022) (0.037) (0.024)
LESS than 60 years 
old
TEACHER
CIVIL SERVANT
tax effort
Debt per capita
Debt per capita*aid 
to poor 
municipalities
COAL GOV
OTHER LEFT
WOMAN
Less than 10 
schools
POP 2-14
Priority education 
network
Aid to poor urban 
municipalities
Aid to poor rural 
municipalities
Aid to poor 
municipalities
all 3500-9000 inhab. >9000 inhab. all 3500-9000 inhab. >9000 inhab.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
VARIABLES REFORM2013 BOYCOTT REFORM2013 BOYCOTT REFORM2013 BOYCOTT REFORM2013 BOYCOTT REFORM2013 BOYCOTT REFORM2013 BOYCOTT
0.075 -0.047*** 0.076 -0.041*** 0.083 -0.068** 0.075 -0.047*** 0.077 -0.037*** 0.081 -0.068**
(0.046) (0.014) (0.050) (0.010) (0.082) (0.027) (0.046) (0.014) (0.051) (0.011) (0.083) (0.027)
0.010 0.033 0.063 0.040 -0.063 0.018 0.011 0.034 0.064 0.047 -0.065 0.018
(0.046) (0.025) (0.063) (0.036) (0.058) (0.041) (0.046) (0.025) (0.064) (0.038) (0.058) (0.041)
0.027 0.040* 0.104 0.032 0.000 0.052* 0.025 0.042* 0.098 0.031 0.000 0.053*
(0.043) (0.021) (0.084) (0.045) (0.051) (0.032) (0.043) (0.022) (0.084) (0.045) (0.052) (0.032)
-0.024 0.023 0.005 0.004 -0.039 0.040 -0.028 0.025 0.001 0.007 -0.042 0.043
(0.044) (0.032) (0.087) (0.049) (0.045) (0.046) (0.042) (0.032) (0.085) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046)
0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 -0.001 0.001* 0.000* 0.000 0.001** 0.000 -0.001 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.011 -0.005 -0.032 0.012 0.051 -0.051* -0.011 -0.005 -0.031 0.011 0.049 -0.049*
(0.022) (0.013) (0.030) (0.012) (0.036) (0.028) (0.022) (0.012) (0.030) (0.012) (0.036) (0.028)
0.016 0.016 0.018 -0.007 0.020 0.042 0.016 0.016 0.018 -0.005 0.021 0.041
(0.022) (0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.036) (0.027) (0.022) (0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.036) (0.026)
0.044 0.026 0.040 0.011 0.066 0.032 0.046* 0.025 0.042 0.014 0.069 0.030
(0.027) (0.022) (0.035) (0.022) (0.049) (0.041) (0.027) (0.022) (0.034) (0.023) (0.049) (0.041)
0.013 0.034 0.008 0.017 0.021 0.040 0.017 0.033 0.012 0.019 0.024 0.038
(0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.027) (0.051) (0.045) (0.029) (0.028) (0.035) (0.026) (0.052) (0.044)
0.007*** -0.000 0.008*** -0.001 0.007*** -0.001 0.007*** -0.000 0.008*** -0.001 0.007*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
-0.048* -0.016 -0.059* -0.012 -0.015 -0.036 -0.048* -0.015 -0.057* -0.006 -0.018 -0.036
(0.028) (0.016) (0.033) (0.014) (0.040) (0.026) (0.028) (0.016) (0.033) (0.014) (0.039) (0.027)
0.055 -0.022 0.028 0.003 0.091*** -0.060** 0.057 -0.021 0.028 0.003 0.097*** -0.062**
(0.040) (0.019) (0.050) (0.017) (0.033) (0.027) (0.041) (0.018) (0.050) (0.017) (0.033) (0.027)
-0.031 0.018 -0.010 -0.002 -0.063** 0.050** -0.031 0.018 -0.010 -0.002 -0.064** 0.050**
(0.024) (0.019) (0.032) (0.019) (0.028) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.032) (0.019) (0.027) (0.023)
0.004 0.014 -0.004 0.032 0.104 -0.003 0.015 -0.007 0.030 0.082
(0.034) (0.024) (0.036) (0.025) (0.177) (0.034) (0.023) (0.036) (0.024) (0.172)
0.086*** 0.002 0.106*** -0.010 0.048 0.025 0.082** 0.003 0.101** -0.014 0.046 0.027
(0.032) (0.020) (0.039) (0.015) (0.038) (0.028) (0.032) (0.020) (0.039) (0.015) (0.038) (0.028)
0.261*** -0.054** 0.252*** -0.044** 0.283*** -0.054* 0.257*** -0.054** 0.249*** -0.046** 0.280*** -0.052*
(0.044) (0.025) (0.052) (0.023) (0.059) (0.030) (0.044) (0.024) (0.052) (0.023) (0.060) (0.030)
Observations 2,612 2,612 1,614 1,614 998 988 2,612 2,612 1,614 1,614 998 988
Pseudo R² 0.2064 0.1070 0.1832 0.1016 0.2726 0.1639 0.2075 0.1101 0.1848 0.0945 0.2735 0.1655
Percent of correct 
predictions 79.2% 89.9% 80.1% 91.7% 80.5% 85.9% 79.7% 89.9% 79.9% 91.7% 80.5% 86.2%
Reform 2013 in the 
core city
* denotes significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. Marginal effects computed at means. Robust errors into parentheses. Froot (1989) correction for departmental-level cluster correlation.
all 3500-9000 inhab. >9000 inhab. all 3500-9000 inhab. >9000 inhab.
PRESID_LEFT 2012
joining a city union 
in 2014
Extraact _ city 
union
Transport _ city 
union
rural areas
Core city of the city 
union
SENATOR
MARGIN 2008
1st ROUND
2nd term
3rd term
More than 3 terms
PUBLIC 
ENTERPRISES
PHYSICIANS
DEPUTY
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Table 3. Incumbent margin, first round of the 2014 municipal election 
 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 -11 -12
REFORM2013 -0.133*** -0.103 -0.159*** -0.161*** -0.118* -0.177***
(0.048) (0.097) (0.038) (0.040) (0.063) (0.048)
REFORM2013 X INC_COALGOV 0.028 0.014 0.019
(0.024) (0.032) (0.036)
BOYCOTT2014 0.177*** 0.084 0.197*** 0.178*** 0.102 0.193***
(0.042) (0.208) (0.071) (0.036) (0.090) (0.046)
BOYCOTT X INC_COALGOV 0.084** 0.083 0.071*
(0.034) (0.053) (0.043)
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.011 0.010 0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.007 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.020)
WOMAN_GAP -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.024* -0.028** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.024** -0.028**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
AGE-GAP -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INC_COALGOV -0.144*** -0.159*** -0.137*** -0.153*** -0.146*** -0.163*** -0.146*** -0.164*** -0.138*** -0.155*** -0.147*** -0.169***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.030) (0.032) (0.024) (0.025) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
CHALL_COALGOV 0.101*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.102*** 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.102*** 0.104***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
0.078*** 0.065*** 0.055** 0.044** 0.090*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.065*** 0.054*** 0.043** 0.089*** 0.076***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
-0.031*** -0.031*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.030*** -0.029***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
0.019*** 0.018*** 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.013 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.003 0.002 0.012* 0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mandate²
Past win margin_ 1st round
Elected in the first round of 
the preceding election
Share of votes at the 
presidential election
# of candidates, same wing
# of candidates, opposite 
wing
# of consecutive years of 
mandate
all 3500-9000 inhab. >9000 inhab. all 3500-9000 inhab. >9000 inhab.
INC MARGIN1 INC MARGIN1 INC MARGIN1 INC MARGIN1 INC MARGIN1 INC MARGIN1
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-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 -11 -12
Deputy 0.092*** 0.079*** 0.038 0.025 0.073*** 0.066*** 0.091*** 0.079*** 0.039 0.026 0.072*** 0.067***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.032) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.043) (0.044) (0.020) (0.020)
Senator 0.071*** 0.063*** 0.058 0.046 0.058** 0.054** 0.070** 0.065** 0.057 0.048 0.057* 0.055*
(0.020) (0.022) (0.051) (0.045) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.060) (0.060) (0.032) (0.032)
0.067 0.072 0.097 0.114 0.076 0.063 0.066 0.072 0.096 0.112 0.074 0.066
(0.067) (0.070) (0.096) (0.096) (0.083) (0.090) (0.056) (0.055) (0.082) (0.082) (0.076) (0.076)
0.075*** 0.075*** 0.042 0.035 0.050* 0.060* 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.043 0.035 0.050 0.058*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.042) (0.039) (0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.042) (0.042) (0.034) (0.034)
0.032** 0.039** 0.046** 0.053** 0.022 0.025 0.031* 0.040** 0.046* 0.054** 0.022 0.025
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
-0.036*** -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.024*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.024** -0.036***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 2384 2384 1410 1410 974 974 2384 2384 1410 1410 974 974
Log pseudolikelihood -597.27  -296.52 -398.47 -161.24 -143.06  -75.01  -596.61 -293.55 -398.38 -160.02 -142.91 -73.66
Wald Test of indep. Eq.: 
Chi(2)  10.06***  8.52***  0.47  0.08  16.24*** 8.69***  12.40 ***  19.17***  1.74  1.03  19.03 ***  14.15***
INC MARGIN1 INC MARGIN1
all 3500-9000 inhab. >9000 inhab. all 3500-9000 inhab. >9000 inhab.
Operating costs net from 
interest charges  (per capita)
Staff costs (per capita)
Equipment spending (per 
capita)
Debt (per capita)
Robust errors into parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Intercept not reported. Froot (1989) correction for departmental-level cluster correlation. Results of 
the treatment equation not reported
INC MARGIN1 INC MARGIN1 INC MARGIN1 INC MARGIN1
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